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Abstract 
The culture of an organisation is a vital element of business competency that must align with its 
strategic goals, and enhance peoples’ perceptions, feelings and behaviour in adapting to the 
world around them. Organisational culture may also bring about negative practices such as 
dishonesty and unethical behaviours. Recently the culture of some construction organisations 
has been called into question. For example, major construction projects around the globe have 
become involved in allegations of fraud and corruption. The cost is currently estimated at 
US$860 billion globally; with forecasts that it may rise to US$1.5 trillion by 2025. Hitherto the 
role of the culture of construction organisations in fraud and corruption activities has been 
largely hidden. The study aim is to establish whether the culture of construction organisations 
promotes corrupt practices in the UK construction and infrastructure sector. The study 
employed mixed research methods with interviews supported by a questionnaire and an 
examination of five case studies in different countries. Findings show that the culture of 
construction organisations together with the nature of the industry promotes fraud and 
corruption. The study subsequently highlights key cultural factors that support fraud and 
corruption in a way that is almost institutionalised.   
Keywords: Construction, corruption, culture, organisations  
Paper type: Research article 
Introduction 
Fraud and corruption is arguably a pervasive trait in doing business; and there is a growing 
worldwide concern over a high level of corrupt activities among corporate organisations. The 
nature and traits of fraud and corruption show that the acts are closely linked to culture, 
organisation values and beliefs that people hold. Arguably, the way construction organisations 
operate tends to make them vulnerable to corrupt practices. For example, the culture of most 
construction organisations is such that the use of lengthy supply chains and complex contractual 
arrangements are customary. Moreover, negotiation for commercial interest is a common 
practice in the construction and infrastructure sector. Thus, there are opportunities for clients, 
consultants, contractors, and suppliers to leverage payments or other benefits for private gain 
(Ernst and Young, 2012). Corruption may exist in the context of inappropriate activities of 
organisations with perhaps the knowledge of many individuals in those organisations, but with 
no personal gains. Corruption may also involve the activities of individuals who act for personal 
gain without the knowledge of their companies. Thus, the study aim is to establish whether the 
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culture of construction organisations promotes corrupt practices in the UK construction and 
infrastructure sector. The main objective of the study is to identify whether this culture of 
construction organisations supports corrupt practices in the construction industry. 
Virtually all business dealings with corrupt traits in the construction industry have human and 
organisational aspects to them. Indeed the idea of corruption plays a powerful role in thinking 
about organisations and the behaviour of those entrusted with responsibilities (Levine, 2005). 
According to Transparency International (TI, 2006, p.5) "nowhere is corruption more ingrained than in 
the construction sector". The problem of corrupt practices in the sector seems to be exacerbated by 
the culture (the characteristics, knowledge of groups of people and organisational values) in the 
industry. Yet, research into the culture of construction organisations in the context of fraud and 
corruption are scarce. Harinarain et al (2013) asserts that the culture of organisations is powerful, 
and in most cases unconsciously forceful; it determines the behaviour of both individual and 
groups. Thus, it is vital to ascertain whether the culture of construction organisations influences 
apparent unending corrupt practices in construction. 
Gates (2014) asserts that across industries, corruption is a major facet of business that most 
organisations have to face; and sadly it is under-reported as a distinctive problem. Most often, 
greed and a quest for quick profit are the major features driving corruption among companies 
(Stansbury, 2005). Some companies in construction may feel the need to devise means to avoid 
competition in order to maximise profit; a concept of economic rent. Construction businesses 
are project based, heavily influenced by clients and in most cases contracts are awarded based on 
tendering processes which emphasise lowest cost as the key selection criteria. Therefore, a 
tendency and temptation arises for processes to attract exploitation or bribery.   
Most people believe that corruption is wrong. However, from an economic sense there is 
scepticism about whether businesses believe this is the case; considering the profit maximisation 
concept that underpins business values. An array of fraud and corruption cases in the last decade 
show that the act continues with a combination of individual, human and organisational effort. 
This is especially the case when huge amounts of money are involved. A discerning deduction 
from corruption cases around the globe is that people make up organisations and the culture of 
organisations has the potential to corrupt people. In practice the incentive that motivates 
individuals or corporate entities to behave in a corruption-prone manner is their perception of 
what can be gained easily by trying to take economic advantage of others.  
Arguably, there is no universally accepted academic theory or model that relates the culture of 
organisations to corruption; though on a global scale corruption has been a key feature of 
institutions and organisations. Nevertheless it is only recently the theme of corruption has 
become the subject of sustained scientific analysis; and models that underpin the study of 
corruption only theorise why it occurs. The most likely theories that may help provide insight 
into the relationship between the culture of organisations and corruption-prone attitudes are 
economic concepts such as economic rent and profit maximisation theories. Indeed, these 
theories are important because the main objective of any business is to maximise profit, wealth 
or both. In a business sense, most organisations will achieve their objectives using quick and 
least costly means, regardless of altered forms.  
For example, Lambsdorff (2001) in a research paper titled "Corruption in Empirical Research - 
A Review" put forward theoretical insights of how institutional economics can be used to 
understand why corruption occurs and the best policies to combat it. But with a large rise in 
fraud cases and corruption in the last decade, there is a need to look beyond known causes. Thus 
there is a need to examine hidden factors such as the culture of organisations and the role of 
government as an institution or regulator. This is imperative because there is a growing number 
of fraud and corruption cases that dominate news headlines on a daily basis such as: the 2015 
scandal at the Federation of International Football Association (FIFA); the pharmaceutical giant 
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GlaxoSmithKline fraud of 2012 in the USA that led to a record fine of $3BN in the USA; and 
the Halliburton Plc bribery scandal that involved paying more than $6 Billion to win a 
construction contract in the Nigeria Liquefied Natural - Gas project. All attest to the fact that 
fraud and corruption cases have organisational facets to them (Calkins, 2009; Runde et al, 2014).   
The Grant Thornton International Ltd (GTIL, 2013, p.3) cited USA based Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners (ACFE, 2013) to have claimed that “the cost of fraud and corruption in the 
construction industry is currently estimated at US$860 billion globally; with the propensity of rising to US$1.5 
trillion by 2025”. There are many examples of major construction projects that have come to 
completion with allegations of fraud and corruption. For example, the Sochi 2014 Winter 
Olympics’ facility has been adjudged the most expensive sport complex in the world. The initial 
"construction budget was put at US$12 billion, and subsequently rocketed up to US$51 billion as a result of 
alleged kickbacks and embezzlement through corrupt construction contracts" (Masters, 2014). In the UK the 
Office of Fair Trading (OFT, 2009) fined 103 construction companies and firms in England and 
Wales for collusion with competitors to get building contracts. The investigation of the OFT 
(2009) into bidding and cover pricing, led to the imposition of fines totalling £129.5M on various 
organisations, though this amount was subsequently reduced on appeal.  
It is possible that the culture of organisations can explain differences in business behaviour and 
its meanings. A right business culture may help organisations to be morally upright, entrench 
good business ethics and above all help them to flourish profitability (Schein 1990). Thus, with 
allegations and evidence of construction organisations involvement in corrupt practices, there is 
need for thorough examination on whether the culture of organisations influences fraudulent 
practices.  
Literature Review 
There is a growing worldwide concern over high levels of corrupt activities among corporate 
organisations. Transparency International (TI, 2011) asserts that majority of construction 
businesses around the globe "are vulnerable to corruption ... and the industry is one of the most 
corrupt sectors in which to do business”. In addition, notable reports such as the Chartered 
Institute of Building (CIOB, 2013) publication ‘Exploring corruption in the UK Construction 
Industry’ seem to corroborate the aphorism that the construction sector is corrupt. 
Unfortunately, despite widespread corruption allegations against the industry, research on the 
culture of construction organisations in relation to fraud and corruption has not received 
appropriate attention. Perhaps a combination of the theme culture and corruption is difficult to 
research due to the sensitive nature of both subjects. In addition, many businesses may be 
reluctant to partake in research concerning the subject, since they may not wish to be involved in 
anything that may damage reputations or curtail their activities. In some quarters, corruption is 
not considered a misdemeanour because it is seen as a necessary aspect of doing business 
(Hawley, 2000; GTIL, 2013).  
Defining corruption is difficult and the underlying complexity in the definition of corruption 
stems from the fact that what may be perceived by one person to be corrupt is often considered 
common practice by another. For instance, research conducted by the Chartered Institute of 
Building (CIOB, 2013, p.3) shows that “around 25% of their research participants felt that accepting or 
concealing bribes was either not very corrupt or not corrupt at all”. Many definitions of corruption exist. 
However, the Institute of Internal Auditors (IIA, 2012) defines corruption as an act which takes 
place in the form of providing or soliciting illicit benefits; and it is hard to detect. Corrupt 
practice normally manifests itself as follows: bribery, embezzlement, extortion, influence 
peddling, unlawful gratuity, favour, commission, nepotism and illegal payments (OECD, 2013). 
Uneke (2010, p.43) argued that the culture of many western multinational organisations is 
hypocritical; "they are virtuous in the developed world and a hub for corrupt activities in developing countries". 
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This assertion seems to uphold the UK Office of Fair Trading (OFT, 2009) fine of £2.25M on 
Balfour Beatty for alleged involvement in "payment irregularities" in the construction of the Great 
Library of Alexandria in Egypt. According to the OFT (2009) "the company's culture outside the shore 
of the UK fell below expectations".  
The culture of construction organisations and corruption 
There are varied perceptions concerning organisational culture and its influence over businesses. 
However, Human Factors International (HFI, 2011, p.3 claims that “most theorists agree that 
organisational culture exists, and that it has definite effects, but an explicit definition of its true nature eludes 
capture”. Notwithstanding, an array of definitions of organisational culture exist. The most cited 
definition is proffered by Schein (1990, p. 116) who claimed that organisation culture is “a pattern 
of basic assumptions invented, discovered and developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of 
external adaptation and internal integration that has worked well enough to be considered valid and is therefore 
taught to new members as the correct way to perceive, think about, and feel in relation to those problems”. 
Nevertheless, regardless of theoretical definitions of organisational culture every organisation has 
a way of defining its culture to suit their way of operation. Many businesses see their 
organisational culture as: 
• the company’s philosophy 
• company style of operation 
• the way we do things around here 
Zuo and Zillante (2005) argued that construction organisations have two broad cultures: the 
organisational culture and project culture. Gareis and Huemann (2000), claim that project culture 
is often underpinned by project objectives. In most cases, it is the project manager responsibility 
to shape a project culture that stimulates teamwork and high levels of personal motivation, as 
well as a capacity to quickly identify and resolve problems that threaten project work (Zuo and 
Zillante, 2005). Perhaps, it is necessary to strengthen project culture because of its potential to 
encourage corrupt practices at project level in the midst of complex supply chains. In addition, 
project culture can easily be corrupted due to vast amount of power entrusted in the hands of 
project managers; indeed, ‘absolute power, they say, corrupts absolutely’.  It is important to 
mention that the culture exhibited at project level is often a reflection of the leadership and 
organisational structure that is adopted for each project (Widemen, 2001). 
Within the construction context, there are number of definitions regarding corruption, however 
they do not go on to measure or assess the role of organisations and project culture influence on 
corrupt practices in the industry. Anderson (2003) made efforts to measure the influence of 
project culture on overall project performance together with an assessment of culture at both the 
project level and the organisational level. The findings show that task-oriented culture is widely 
accepted as the most appropriate project culture, with direct influence on performance 
parameters such as functionality and participant satisfaction. Thus, there remains a gap in 
knowing whether project culture is more prone to fraud and corruption, compared to 
organisational culture.  
While considerable variation exists about whether the culture of organisations within the 
construction influences corruption, research findings from TI (2006), OECD (2013) and CIOB 
(2013) portray that corruption and other fraudulent practices are more prevalent in pre-
construction stages, especially in tendering stages. Soreide (2006, p.17) claimed that "the function of 
procurement procedures is a major source of corruption in the construction industry; with 42% of company 
executive officers claiming that they have reason to believe that competitors had been influencing tender procedures 
unduly”. Arguably, the issue of tendering, pre-construction and procurement of projects are 
strategic matters often dealt with at organisational levels. This may lead to a conclusion that 
corruption is possibly prevalent within organisational cultures. 
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Subcontracting norms that dominate present day construction may serve to enhance corruption 
and other fraudulent practices. The reliance on subcontractors has put much stress on main 
contractor-subcontractor relationships and in such situations corruption may occur. Humphreys 
et al (2003) argued that main contractors have realised that the greatest potential for cost savings 
lies with the use of subcontractors; thus a situation where many segments of construction are 
subcontracted to other companies. The process of Dutch auctions may contribute to the corrupt 
practices in the industry, because it encourages unhealthy competition, underpinned by 
‘kickbacks’ to project officers that award subcontracts (Stansbury, 2005). 
Corruption perpetuated at project level may simply be referred to as ‘bricks and mortar’ 
corruption; because large volumes of construction components are often concealed by other 
elements. For example, most construction works such as block laying, plumbing and electrical 
installations are normally covered by brickwork, plasterboard or paint. Stansbury (2005) argues 
that the industry is one where an enormous number of inspections of materials are being 
completed on a daily basis, and supervision of work is dependent on contractors. Thus, once 
materials are covered it is very difficult and costly to check their authenticity and the quality of 
workmanship. This kind of culture may lead to the use of inferior materials and poor 
workmanship. The resultant effects can be seen from an increase in defective works and the 
number of collapsed buildings around the word. 
The nature of construction projects in terms of complexity of schemes, tasks, costing/estimation 
of project elements, diverse procurement arrangements, contractual structure, diversity of skills, 
extent of government involvement in projects, concealed work, project phases, uniqueness of 
projects, size of projects and above all secrecy that surrounds projects appears to make 
corruption, fraud and other sharp practices possible (TI, 2006). Moreover, complex contractual 
structures for which the construction industry is known, that usually involves lengthy supply 
chains in the form of clients, consultants, main contractors, subcontractors, sub-subcontractors 
and suppliers appears to make the fight against corruption more difficult.  
Stansbury (2005) argues that many construction projects (especially government owned schemes) 
are managed under strict price secrecy and industry norms simply encourage cost elements of 
projects (price of items) to be kept secret even when it is public money that is being spent. This 
means confidentiality normally takes precedence over public interest. This sort of culture does 
not only aid and abet corruption in the industry, it can make it undetectable.  
A review of organisational culture and corruption cases show that the problem is multi-
dimensional; in some cases leading to manipulation of project prices to secure contracts and to 
maximise profits. Some practitioners may not consider cover pricing as a corrupt practice, 
because there is no money changing hands. The Construction Manager Magazine (CM, 2013) 
affirms that corruption and unethical conduct by professionals during the construction phase are 
commonplace among major contractors. Unethical practices may include items such as false 
identification, ghost workers and inflation of workers’ hours (time sheets). For example, CM 
(2013) report that an operations manager of Balfour Beatty, a major construction company in the 
UK, “was jailed for three years in October 2012 after he and two other managers defrauded the company of 
£165,000 by authorising payments to two bogus workers who were not employed by the company. The fraud ran 
over five years from November 2005 to March 2011 and involved creating 'ghost' employees and putting their 
personal details on the payroll. Time sheets were then created and signed off by the managers". 
Other examples of high profile corruption cases in construction are: the Lesotho Highlands 
Water Project (LHWP) scandal in South Africa; the Abuja Airport runway expansion scam of 
2010; the Unik Construction Engineering (pty) Limited water project embezzlement in 
Botswana; the Laxmi Narayan Construction fraud case in India; the China Hunan Construction 
Engineering Group Corporation corruption case; the BRUN-WAY Construction Inc fraud case 
in Canada and the recent allegation of corruption in the Winter Olympics in Sochi, Russia. These 
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cases seem to have something in common; the schemes are mega projects, one-off and involve 
large organisations. These projects come at irregular periods; thus the tendency for large 
construction companies to hunt for such projects. Winning these types of projects may be 
critical to the survival and profitability of contractors involved; hence they provide an incentive 
for bribery and corruption (Darroch, 2007).  
Government involvement in construction either as clients or industry regulators probably 
contributes to organisation’s involvement in corrupt practices.  Indeed, governments are clients 
to over 70% of construction and infrastructure projects around the world and even privatised 
schemes often require government approval for planning or an arrangement to pay end-product 
users (Stansbury, 2005). TI (2006, p.30) claimed that "numerous permits are often required, where there is 
insufficient control on how government officials behave. Thus, their power combined with the structural and 
financial complexity of the projects makes it relatively easy for officials to extract bribes". Politicians with 
influential positions in government may facilitate corruption, by awarding dubious construction 
contracts for personal gain or to fulfil political pledges. 
However, fraudulent activities are not peculiar to construction organisations alone. The act cuts 
across many facets of life; for example those doing business in the oil and gas, transportation, 
aviation and medical industries are not exempted from the problem of corruption.  So far, the 
world’s largest corporate fine and fraud settle of $30BN is in the USA; where the Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) prosecuted British pharmaceutical giant GlaxoSmithKline who pleaded 
guilty for failure to report safety data. The same company was “fined nearly $500 million for bribery in 
Sept. 2014 by a Chinese court” for similar offences (Bradsher and Buckley, 2014).  
Corruption and rent-seeking theory 
Rent-seeking theory is one of the earliest theories that has been used to model corruption. The 
theory compares corruption to lobbying, and suggests that lobbying entails a waste of resources 
in the competition for preferential treatment. The traditional rent-seeking theory considers 
various forms of seeking preferential treatment by public decision makers for instance 
corruption and competitive lobbying as rent-seeking. Based on this insight a formal model was 
propounded by Tullock (1980) which states that there is rational to invest in rent-seeking as long 
as the marginal input is smaller to the potential output it generates. Therefore the resulting 
market equilibrium can be determined by a formal model. The model assumes that organisations 
compete for a monopoly created by a system. Though, this is questionable, for the theory to be 
purposeful the standard assumption is that all organisations take the rent (R) to be given 
exogenously.  
Lambsdorff (2001, p.102) stated that the theory further assumes that the probability for winning 
the competition (pi) is proportional to an organisation's investment in rent-seeking (xi). Given 
that this assumption applies to all firms equally and all probabilities must add up to one, a single 
organisation's probability decreases with the investments undertaken by its competitors. Thus, in 
the case of a number of organisations, this will result in: 
 Pi  
with xi being the expenses for rent-seeking of organisations (i). The resulting equilibrium can 
easily be determined once assumptions are introduced that organisations are risk-neutral, act 
symmetrically and are unable to influence their competitors’ level of rent-seeking (xj). 
Maximising the expected profit, E(PiR–xi), then requires: 
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Function (1) can be solved by introducing symmetry, xi = xj = x. This brings about the Cournot-
Nash-equilibrium and the following optimal level of rent-seeking: 
 
Therefore, total expenses (S) for rent-seeking then sum up to:                                                   S =  
The model assumes that as the number of firms (n) joining the competition increases, 
monopolistic rents increase and more resources (S) are devoted to wasteful lobbying. This 
demonstrates that competition increases waste (Lambsdorff, 2001). Arguably, the theory does 
not put organisation involvement in corrupt practice to bed; and as Thompson (1993, p.369) 
says "corruption is bad not because money and benefits change hands, and not because of the motives of 
participants, but because it privatises values aspects of public life, by-passing processes of representation, debate and 
choice". 
This assertion seem to support Leff’s (1964) view in his publication ‘Economic Development 
through Bureaucratic Control’ that corruption may be considered a useful substitute for a weak 
rule of law. This is insofar as a weak intransigent bureaucracy that is unable to make decisions 
may need corruption in order to progress a situation. Without corruption the wheels of business 
may just grind to a halt, particularly and arguably in under-developed countries. This proposition 
is further expounded by Houston (2007, pp.325–42). The overriding position must remain 
however; corruption is wrong, immoral and, in the majority of instances, illegal. 
Study Methodology 
The study present findings on whether the culture of construction organisations promotes 
corrupt practices in the UK construction industry. The main objective of the study is to identify 
whether the culture of construction organisations supports corrupt practices in the construction 
industry. The study employed mixed research methods; and includes the examination of five case 
studies to facilitate in-depth examination of the research problem. The multi-methods research 
design employed QUAL-QUAN concept; this means that data are collected using both 
qualitative and quantitative methods. However, the qualitative method is the lead data collection 
instrument, whilst quantitative collected data are used to support and validate the qualitative 
findings. The study data collection includes use of structured interviews and a questionnaire 
survey. The data was collected between July 2013 and February 2015. 
Structured interviews 
A non-probability and purposive sampling method was adopted for interviews. Eleven 
professionals with 13 to 22 years of working experience in the construction industry and other 
related disciplines were interviewed. The interviewees were from the private sector, public 
sector, quasi-government organisations and other stakeholders such as Transparency 
International. All were based in the UK. The interview questions were pilot-tested with an 
architect, engineers, quantity surveyors and academics in UK universities. The purpose of the 
pilot study was to ascertain whether questions and instructions were clear and unambiguous 
and if participants found the questions appropriate. Questions that were improper were 
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removed or reconstructed. Study participants preferred to remain anonymous as most of the 
questions were sensitive. As a precaution, all information linked to individuals and 
organisations that participated in the study, was removed. The interview data were 
subsequently analysed using Nvivo 10 software to filter and sort findings. Five case studies 
concerning high profile corruption cases linked to construction giants in five countries: 
Canada, France, Nigeria, the United States of America and Turkey, were subsequently 
analysed. 
Questionnaire survey 
The questionnaire was also pilot-tested to determine whether the measurement instrument 
was clear. A stratified random sample was used. This was to ensure that sample adequately 
represents selected groups in the population. First, the study population was classified into 
strata (groups) on the basis of common characteristics such as the profession and nature of 
work experience relating to the construction industry. The population was also divided into 
four main groups using: size of company, firm, partners, government agencies and others as a 
guide. Group 1 targeted senior managers of large construction companies, Group 2 focused 
on directors of SMEs doing business in the construction industry, Group 3 consultants and 
Group 4 captured senior managers of government and other agencies such as the anti-
corruption agency - Transparency International. 
One hundred and thirteen copies of the questionnaire were prepared and distributed among 
the targeted sample; administered either by hand or through e-mails. A total of 42 
questionnaires were received from participants and deemed valid as shown in Table 1. Using 
formula put forward by Neumann (2000) the active response rate was calculated as 37.17%. 
Easterby-Smith et al (2006, p.96) claim that “if measured appropriately; within the construction industry 
a 25 to 30% response rate is considered acceptable”.  
Since the questionnaire data were obtained from four different groups, Mann-Whitney two 
group post-hoc tests for homogeneity; were conducted using SPSS. The test result shows that 
Mann-Whitney (U), Asymp. Sig. (2-tailed) for Group 1 against Group 2 to be = 0.72; Group 1 
against Group 3 = 0.81; Group 2 against Group 3 = 0.64; and Group 3 against Group 4 (Gp 4) 
= 0.51.  These (U) values show that there no significant difference between data obtained from 
different sources. 
 
Table 1: Category of participants and valid questionnaires considered by the study 
Category of companies and 
clients in construction 
involved in the study 
Total number of 
questionnaires sent to 
participants 
Total number of valid 
questionnaires received 
from participants 
% response 
Major construction companies 
(including service providers) 
74 27 36.49 
Firms and partners 17 6 35.29 
Government agencies 22 9 40.91 
Total 113 42 37.17 
Analysis and Findings 
Questionnaire data key assumptions 
The main criticism from the pilot-tested questionnaire was: does the study expect interviewees to 
base their answers on rumour, deductions from uncertain facts or their involvement in corrupt 
acts. This is imperative considering the facts that the subject is sensitive and participants may be 
Construction Economics and Building, 15(3), 59-71  
 
Arewa and Farrell  67 
 
reluctant to give the truth. This was factored into the final reconstructed questionnaire and it was 
clearly stated that interviewees were to make their judgements on their best knowledge of their 
organisations, and their personal experiences. Based on this key assumption, when study 
participants were asked ‘if they believe that their companies had at one time or the other been 
involved in any act capable of been identified as bribery or corruption in order to get lucrative 
contracts?’, 13% very strongly agree, 46% strongly agree; 8% agree with remaining participants 
either disagreeing or unsure as shown in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1: Participants’ view on construction organisations’ involvement in corrupt practices 
 
Table 2 shows the percentage of participant agreement to common types of fraud/corrupt 
activities in the UK construction industry. The study reveals that 31% of participants agree that 
‘kickbacks’ to project officers or their representatives is the most commonest type of 
fraud/corrupt activity; followed by manipulation of tendering processes with 24%. ‘Shady’ 
subcontracting 19%; bid rigging / cover pricing 18%; bribing of project officers 6%, and; 
falsification of documents 2%. By implication, this means that most corrupt activities takes place 
at strategic levels in the industry.  
 
Table 2: Percentage of common types of fraud/corrupt activities in construction 
Common types of fraud/corrupt activities in the UK 
construction industry 
Percentage of  participants that judge this 
type of fraud most common in the 
construction industry 
‘Kickbacks’ to project officers or their representatives   31 
Manipulation of tendering processes 24 
‘Shady’ subcontracts 19 
Bid rigging/cover pricing 18 
Bribery of project officers to get subcontracts 6 
Falsification of documents 2 
Total 100 
Interview data key assumptions 
Similar assumptions made in the questionnaire data above were also considered in the collection 
of interview data. The interviews were recorded using a digital recorder and subsequently 
transcribed for clear interpretation. Some textual contents of the interview data were trimmed 
from the transcribed data for better understanding and spontaneity of the interaction between 
the lead researcher and study participants. For instance, when participants were asked to express 
their view concerning construction’s involvement in fraud and corrupt practices, their responses 
raised notable issues concerning the study theme. Some of the textual excerpts are highlighted as 
follows:  
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... lobbying for contracts is a common business tactic, … though I have my own reservation about our 
dealings with some construction companies … in recent times corruption is fast becoming an inevitable 
factor (Director in Local Government Authority - UK). 
... the norms in the industry itself promote dishonesty ... the competition out there is stiff ... these 
organisations have to play the game otherwise the smart folks, will make their business redundant (Project 
Manager for large construction company). 
Moreover, interviewees were asked to identify key organisational culture features in the 
construction industry that promote fraud and corruption. Below are some of the excerpts: 
... everything about the industry, I mean everything about construction encourages corruption ... the nature 
of the industry itself, unnecessary competition from rivals, the politics of hunting for contracts down to 
nature of clients out there … when you talk about corruption in construction, ... we need to bear in mind 
that it is a tough industry and purely a client-led industry. Most businesses will do anything to buy favour 
from clients. They say ‘he who plays the piper dictates the tune’ … it is obvious that large scale corruption 
normally involves people in authority; the record is there for all to see. As a researcher have you heard of 
any high profile corruption cases without big boy's involvement? (Construction Manager in a large 
construction company). 
...tendering processes in construction seem to fall short of expected standards ... the culture of subcontracting 
… together with the nature of most projects normally brings about unhealthy internal competition ... in 
many countries there is a kind of cartel culture between few large construction organisations and they often 
set standards to determine what they want ... this sort of norm often gives undue advantage to large 
companies when it comes to securing huge government contracts .... Moreover, we cannot take away lobbying 
for contracts from these [sic] companies ... this is what makes the industry work. (Senior Partner - QS and 
Cost management firm) 
 
Table 3: Case studies of corruption involving major construction companies 
  
Name of organisations, country and 
nature of corruption Year 
Case 
outcome 
Organisational behaviour that led 
to fraud and corruption 
1 Bouygues, Suez-Lyonnaise and Vivendi 
Corrupt Cartel in France (Nature of 
charges: fraud and corruption). 
1998 - 
2005 
Prosecution 
and fine. 
Misappropriation of public funds; 
‘kickback’ to government officers and 
complex contractual arrangements. 
2 Construction contract scandal involving 
several projects and building companies 
in Turkey (Nature of charges: fraud and 
corruption). 
2014 -
2015 
Allegation, 
still under 
investigation. 
Fraudulent award of contracts; undue 
fraternity between representative of 
construction organisations and 
government officers; high level 
lobbying for contracts; use of 
unscrupulous companies and 
manipulation of tender processes.   
3 Dantata and Sawoe Ltd, ’Kickback’ 
payment  of N1.3 Billion involving high 
profile government officer in Nigeria  
(Nature of charges: fraud and 
corruption). 
Jun-
2014 
Allegation, 
still under 
investigation. 
The use of fraudulent subcontractors, 
owned by government officers; lack of 
transparent tendering processes; 
monthly valuation manipulated to 
influence payment to companies and 
inflated project estimates. 
4 Balfour Beatty Plc, Bribery and 
Accounting Fraud Scandal involving 
State of Delaware, United States (Nature 
of charge: fraud). 
May 
2013 
Prosecution. Evidence of fraudulent and complex 
contractual arrangements; cartelising 
bidding processes and undue payment 
from organisation' accounts. 
5 The Charbonneau Commission, Canada:  
Public Contracts scam involving several 
construction companies (Nature of 
charges: fraud and corruption). 
Oct. 
2011 
Prosecution 
and fine. 
Bid rigging, cartels, manipulation of 
contract prices, tendering processes, 
rates and undue relations between 
government officers and construction 
contractors. 
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Apart from questionnaire and interview data, five case studies were scrutinised to provide in-
depth and practical understanding on how organisational culture influences corruption in the 
construction industry. The extracts from the five case studies concerning alleged high profile 
corruption cases involving construction companies in five countries were examined and are 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 4 illustrates summary of construction organisational behaviour captured from five case 
studies concerning high profile corruption cases; in addition to themes recorded by Nvivo 10 
when participants were asked to enumerate key construction organisational cultures that 
encourages fraud and corruption in construction. 
 
Table 4: Summary of organisational culture that encourages fraud and corruption  
+ and - 
cultural 
practices 
Organisational cultural 
theme 
Frequency + and - 
cultural 
practices 
Organisational cultural 
theme 
Frequency 
   
     + 
Lobbying for contracts and 
attempts to out-perform 
competitors sometimes brings 
about corrupt practices in 
industry. 
  
 4 
 
- 
Poor remuneration of 
employees is common 
practices  
 
2 
 
- 
The culture of construction 
organisations challenges 
competing value frameworks 
 
1 
 
- 
The culture of low profit 
margins encourages 
institutional corruption. 
 
1 
 
- 
The culture focuses more on 
‘getting things done through 
people’. 
 
2 
 
+ 
The culture of tendering 
for jobs gives 
opportunities for 
corruption. 
 
4 
 
- 
Inability to innovate the use 
of electronic payment systems 
for construction project 
transactions. 
 
5 
 
- 
Transparency often scarce 
in tendering processes. 
  
 6 
 
- 
The industry is heavily client-
led, thus the tendency for 
contractors to ‘dance to the 
tune’ of most clients. 
  
 4 
 
+ 
Secrecy of prices and rates 
often common practice 
among construction 
organisations. 
 
2 
 
- 
Lack of institutional and 
strong ethics enforcement 
from professional bodies in 
industry. 
 
1 
 
- 
Culture of lowest bidder 
often encourages corrupt 
practices.  
 
3 
 
- 
The culture allows ‘all comers’ 
with little or no professional 
training; few barriers to entry. 
  
    2 
 
+ 
Lobbying for high value 
contracts is a common 
cultural practice 
 
5 
 
+ 
The pervasive use of 
subcontractors and 
consultants. 
 
6 
 
+ 
Payments to contractors 
heavily depends on QS 
valuation methods. 
 
2 
 
- 
Complex contractual 
arrangements by 
organisations. 
 
3 
 
- 
Most construction 
organisations operate 
weak record management 
systems. 
 
4 
 
- 
culture of inaccurate project 
estimates; arguably tends to 
encourage corruption. 
 
2 
 
- 
Informal payments’ 
culture common among 
small businesses in the 
industry. 
  
 3 
 
- 
the culture of some 
organisations encourages 
cover-up of wrong doings;  
thus whistle-blowing is scarce 
in the sector. 
 
3 
 
- 
Cartel sort of culture may 
sometimes exist among 
large companies. 
 
5 
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Conclusion 
A deduction from the study is that tackling corruption among organisations is difficult because 
there are discernible benefits to those who partake in corrupt activities; at least in an economic 
sense. The nature and traits of fraud and corruption show that the act is closely linked to culture, 
organisation values and beliefs that people hold. Arguably, the way construction organisations 
operate tends to make them vulnerable to corrupt practices. The culture of most construction 
organisations is such that the use of lengthy supply chains and complex contractual arrangements 
are customary. Moreover, negotiation for commercial interests and complex contract 
arrangements are common practice in the construction and infrastructure sector. Thus, there is 
the possibility for clients, consultants, contractors and suppliers to leverage payments or other 
benefits for organisational or private gain. 
There are polarised views about what constitutes corrupt activities and the extent of corruption 
in the construction industry. However, findings from the study show that the culture of 
construction organisations, together with the nature of the industry, may facilitate fraud and 
corruption. The study also reveals that the pervasive use of subcontractors and consultants, the 
lack of transparency in tendering processes, lobbying for contracts, cover pricing and cartels, 
among other factors, may support fraud and corruption in an institutionalised manner. 
Examination of five high profile fraud and corruption cases shows that fraudulent award of 
subcontracts, use of unscrupulous companies, lack of transparency in tender processes and 
cartels by mainly large organisations, are cultural practices that fuel corruption. Over 60% of the 
study participants claim that they have reason to believe that their organisations had at one time 
or the other acted in a corrupt manner. 
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